I am afraid he might be mistaken. There is no doubt a presumption in saying this since, unlike him, I do not meet regularly with the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, but I fear that Emmanuel Macron is wrong when he says and he keeps hammering that “we must not humiliate Russia”.
Let there be no misunderstanding. When the time comes for peace negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow, all democracies and all people of reason must refuse to repeat the tragic mistake of the Treaty of Versailles. It must not be done with Russia what the victors of the First World War had done with Germany, ruining and humiliating it so much that it sought revenge in a new war.
Once the aggression has been defeated, it will of course be necessary to ensure that Russia is not “humiliated”, but today?
Once the aggression has been defeated, it will of course be necessary to ensure that Russia is not “humiliated”, but today?
This makes no sense. In any case, it cannot be understood by the Ukrainians who are indignant and protesting about it. Nor is it accepted by the other countries that left the Soviet bloc. It isolates France from the oldest member states of the Union and, worse still, resurrects the old suspicion of a historical connivance linking Paris to Moscow at the expense of Central Europe.
Without doing anyone any good, France is only doing itself harm, but does this mean that Emmanuel Macron would also be mistaken in considering that France’s role is to be a “mediating power” in this case?
On the contrary, he is right to think so because the Revolution of 1789, the cultural imprint of France in Russia, the Gaullian gesture and the constant singularity of French diplomacy in the Western camp have created a special bond with France in Russian leadership circles and the Russian people. Russia perceives the French as long-standing friends with whom disagreements do not undermine trust. This is true of all political currents and all generations and, in this crisis, it gives France a special responsibility.
Not only is France the least badly placed country to maintain an open channel between Kiyv and Moscow while arming the Ukrainians, but its culture and its long history as a world power give it the means to envisage the conditions for continental stabilisation without which there will be no lasting peace between Ukraine and Russia.
It is from France that the impulse for a new link between the European Union and the Russian Federation can come. France can play a major role in bringing these two pillars of the continent closer together and enabling the development of a new continental deal. This stake alone should be enough to forbid France to allow the shadow of a lack of understanding of its policy in the other capitals of the Union to creep in, but what can it do, under these conditions, to avoid spoiling its chances of contributing to peace?
Firstly, it must relax its relations with Ukraine by ceasing to harp on the need not to humiliate Russia and thus give itself the opportunity to continue to play the role of good offices between Kyiv and Moscow.
Secondly, France should be the most active supporter of Ukraine and plead for it to be granted the status of candidate state to the European Union so that it can legitimately work, when the time comes, on the historical compromises necessary for the perpetuation of peace.
Finally, France should work to ensure that the 27 publicly propose to Russia, its people and its leaders, the broad outlines of the security and cooperation agreement that they would like to sign with it once the aggression against Ukraine has stopped. The EU would thereby feed the Russian political debate. It would also prepare for the future and, above all, show its willingness to reach out to Russia, to treat it as an indispensable partner and certainly not to humiliate it.
