And yet there it is, taking shape. Worse than being non-existent, it was said to be impossible, given the different and often contradictory histories, cultural connivances and world perceptions of the various states of the Union. But if we look at it more closely, and pay attention not so much to the weight of the past but rather to the sum of its evolutions, we can see a European foreign policy emerging from its limbo.
There was a time recently when Germany considered that nothing should strain its relations with the Eldorado that was China, and then suddenly a turn was taken.
After Mrs Merkel hastened the signing of an investment agreement between the European Union and Beijing at the end of December, it was enough that the Chinese leadership sanction the European Parliament’s Human Rights Committee and members of almost all its groups, all guilty of speaking out against the plight of the Uighurs and Hong Kong democrats, for Germany to no longer stand in the way of toughening the European approach towards Beijing.
Mr Xi had gone a bit too far. He is paying the price for it, but beyond this Chinese blunder, Germany has come to realise that China now aspires to exercise the same political, military and technological pre-eminence over the world that the United States has enjoyed since 1945.
While American democracy is far from being perfect, China is an exemplary dictatorship, against which the Union’s policy tends to be more and more aligned. In the corridors and between the benches of the European Parliament, this change is glaringly obvious, but a word now about Turkey, Russia and the United States.
When it comes to Washington, the differences between the most and least Atlanticist European states are tending to disappear, as Donald Trump has made clear the need for a European Defence, while Joe Biden has been able to seduce Europeans by reaching out to the Union, proposing his “alliances of democracies” and organising the return of Keynesianism and the strategist state that the 27 had undertaken a year before him.
About Turkey, France has now understood that it cannot oppose Recep Erdogan alone and en bloc, while Germany has finally realised that not everything can be handed over to this ageing and brutal megalomaniac who intended to bully the Union and the Atlantic Alliance while claiming to be part of them. The Union is adopting a Turkish policy. It is made up of more firmness and less unacceptable indulgences, and as for Russia, the 27 have now all come out of the illusions of any attempts to revive relations with Mr Putin.
The Union is not, however, adopting a bellicose attitude towards Russia, but is moving towards a greater lucidity with regard to its President, coupled with a long-term openness to the search for an organisation of the European continent based on cooperation between the Union and the Federation.
For the simple reason that Europeans are discovering, in this new century, common solidarities, challenges and interests, we are witnessing the birth of a European foreign policy.
