In the first scenario, everything is tragically clear. If Donald Trump is elected on 5 November, he will not wait even until he takes office to seal with Vladimir Putin a division of Ukraine, based on the model of the two Germanies or the two Koreas.

De facto, if not de jure, the territories occupied by Russian troops would go to the Kremlin, which in return would undertake not to try to advance beyond this demarcation line. This would be Ukraine’s defeat Vladimir Putin’s victory, but a debate would open up immediately, a debate both fundamental and furious.

Should the amputated Ukraine join NATO or not?

Assuming that the agreement reached between the Russian President and his friend Donald did shut the NATO’s door in its face, Ukraine would be more eager than ever to join. The Europeans, for their part, would have a vital interest in seeing Ukraine become the thirty-third member of the Atlantic Alliance, thus benefiting from a level of protection that they cannot provide today on their own. For both Ukraine and the European Union, this enlargement of NATO would be the only real way of preventing Vladimir Putin from rebuilding the Russian empire by soon setting off again for Kiev. In short, Europeans should prepare to fight this battle without waiting for the results on 5 November, but they should be aware of two things.

One is that Donald Trump would not be easily persuaded to accept Ukraine’s accession to a NATO he no longer sees any use for. The other is that the task of the Europeans may not be as limited as trying to tighten the Western ranks under the American umbrella. Knowing that the United States is turning its focus to the Chinese challenge and this President is determined to hasten this process, he may be tempted to altogether turn his back on the Atlantic Alliance.

Under a new Trump presidency, the Europeans would have to learn to exist on their own, to speed up considerably the creation of their common defence and to define new modes and degrees of integration with their Union. They need to this so that they could open their doors to Ukraine and form a common front with it as quickly as possible. The aim would be twofold: to send a message to Russia that if it attacked Ukraine again it would be attacking the whole Union; and to rely on the Ukrainian defence system to shorten the time needed for building a common European defence. In the Trump scenario, the objective of the Europeans should be, to immediately integrate Ukraine into the European Union and possibly into the Atlantic Alliance, but in the Harris scenario?

In this second hypothesis, everything would be both more reassuring and more complicated.

There would be no need to fear that the new American administration would come to an agreement with the Kremlin at the expense of Ukraine and of Europe. Nor would it be conceivable that the United States would suddenly set out to discredit the Atlantic Alliance or would want to leave it overnight. With Kamala Harris, the European Union would not be faced with the challenge of having to reinvent itself in a matter of months, but would the differences between a Harris presidency and a Trump presidency be, in substance, as decisive as they appear?

Unlike Donald Trump, Kamala Harris certainly has no admiration for Vladimir Putin. Unlike him, she does not see the European Union as a rival that America should undo, but she is Californian and was still very young when the Berlin Wall fell. For her, as for Trump, it is not to Europe but to Asia that the United States must turn its gaze, and everything indicates that she would quickly like to bring the Ukrainians to a compromise with Russia that could be very similar to the one envisaged by her Republican opponent.

However, if it is done politely enough so that Europe does not seem betrayed, several European capitals will approve of this approach. On the right, on the left and in the centre, a large part of the public opinion in the 27 member states would also applaud it. In the relief that this illusion of “détente” would bring, it would be difficult to plead for Ukraine’s entry into the Atlantic Alliance or into the European Union

Just as the election of Trump could force the European Union to assume its political responsibilities, the election of Kamala Harris would lead the 27 into deep divergences and a new and dangerous phase of procrastination.

Rather than Ukraine joining the NATO, the Europeans would have to work to ensure that it obtained Western security guarantees. This would be less difficult for them, and rather than immediately trying to enlarge the Union with what would have become “Western Ukraine”, they would have to increase the number of civil and military cooperation agreements with it in order to strengthen their border with Russia and pave the way for future integration.

Harris or Trump, the 5 of November will put the European Union to the test.

(Photo by Andrii Smuryhin)

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